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INTRODUCTION 
 
Crete was among those territories that formed a Venetian protectorate. The Turks 
declared open war on Crete in 1648. It is tempting to assume the ‘long’ siege on Candia 
(modern Heraklion) is a relatively forgotten conflict, overshadowed by the geo-
politically significant siege of Vienna in 1683. After all, Candia was a defeat for the 
forces of Christendom whereas Vienna, just fourteen years later, was a decisive victory 
that achieved a lasting halt to Ottoman expansion westward into Europe. However, 
Candia has received a surprising amount of scholarly attention and has found a place in 
most serious modern studies of the Order of St John, especially those focussing on its 
naval operations. The international diplomatic and military nature of the siege 
generated home-grown sources in Britain while contemporary interest in military siege-
craft made Candia a case-study in combined land/sea operations. The strident genre of 
seventeenth-century pamphlet literature provided a slew of source material in several 
languages. Candia also features in the autobiographies of several prominent military 
figures who gained valuable technical experience there.1 Most importantly, it is 
regarded by many scholars as a key moment in Christian-Muslim interaction to which 
the word ‘crusade’ is applied. 
 
THE SIEGE 
 
The declaration of war was ostensibly provoked by the Venetian Republic allowing the 
galleys of the Knights of St. John to take shelter in Cretan waters in 1645, following an 
attack by them on Ottoman shipping.2 The historian Rhoads Murphy states however, 
that the siege was the result of an ongoing, single–front Ottoman military strategy.3 In 
 
1 J. Mackay of Rockfields (ed.) H. Mackay of Scourie, Life of Lieut. General Hugh Mackay of Scourie 
(Edinburgh: Kessinger Publishing, 1856 [1836]), p. 5; Journal de l'expedition de M. de la Feuillade pour 
le secours de Candie, ed. Volontaire (Lyon: Jean Thioly, 1669); Les mémoires du voyage de Monsieur 
le marquis de Ville au Levant, ou L’histoire curieuse du siège de Candie (Amsterdam: Henry and 
Theodore Boom, 1670). 
 
2 H. J. A. Sire, The Knights of Malta (Yale: Yale University Press, 1996), pp. 93-94. 
 
3 Ernle Bradford, The Shield and the Sword: the Knights of St. John (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd, 
1972), pp. 192–193; ‘Askere fütur gelmegin hizmetden sogudular [. . .] Askere ye’s–i tam gelmekle, 
gittikçe hizmetde tekâsül gösterir oldular’, quoted in M. Naima, Tarih–i Naima, Vol. 4 (Istanbul, 1281–
26 GLOZIER 
 
other words, the naval activity of the Order of St John was a mere pretext for Ottoman 
expansion. They arrived in force: almost 300 vessels and 50,000 soldiers, threatening a 
local population of largely Orthodox peasantry ruled over by a Roman Catholic élite. 
In August 1645 the Ottomans captured the north-westerly port city of Chania, defended 
by its inadequate local militia of 12,000 men. A year later, Rethymno fell to them, aided 
by the ‘passive neutrality’ of the locals, won-over by their lenient treatment by the 
Ottoman besiegers.4 Thus the Turks achieved an early presence on Crete, despite 
ongoing political tensions within the Ottoman empire during the reign of the young 
Mehmed IV.5 Indeed, Turkish morale on Crete was often low: in 1649 it collapsed 
completely when 1,500 Janissaries were granted leave from the siege, prompting those 
soldiers who remained to demand a similar return home.6  The Turks besieged Candia  
intermittently over the next twenty years.  
Initially, Venice did well against the Ottoman forces, winning naval victories in 1649 
and 1656 by using a naval force of a size not achieved since the great campaign at 
Lepanto. However, this prompted an expansion of the Ottoman navy which led to 
Turkish victory in the Dardanelles in 1657, securing control of the Aegean seaways and 
placing increased pressure on the beleaguered defenders of Candia. The breakthrough 
in the Dardanelles was the first major achievement for Köprülü Fazil Ahmed Pasha as 
Grand Vizier (in office 1661-76). However, in the intervening years, the oscillating 
intensity in the Turkish siege allowed Candia to put itself on a footing for protracted 
resistance. Thus began a long drawn-out cat-and-mouse game of mining and counter-
mining the walls around the city. Venice, aided by the Knights of St John, maintained 
supremacy on the sea, thus preventing the blockade of Crete, but it was never able to 
raise European support to field an army of sufficient strength to dislodge the Turks.7 
Even after the Peace of Westphalia, which concluded the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48) 
in continental Europe, it was hard to recruit sufficient enthusiasm to break the deadlock: 
for example, in 1651 the alliance forces consisted of 36 per cent Swedes, Germans, 
French, Swiss; 22 per cent Greeks; 18 per cent Corsicans; 15 per cent Italians; and about 
8 per cent Croatians. Altogether this amounted to no more than approximately 6,000 
 
1283 A.H.: covers period A.D. 1592–1660), p. 447, cited in R. Murphey, Ottoman Warfare, 1500–1700 
(London: UCL Press, 1999), pp. 9, 158, 252 n. 70.  
 
4 P. Morachiello, ‘Candia, I baluardi del regno’, in Venezia e la difesa del Levante: da Lepanto a Candia, 
ed. M. Redolfi (Venice: Arsenale, 1986), p. 139; ‘Sabbatei Levi: A Pretended Messiah’ [From Voltaire’s 
Universal History], in The Scots Magazine, Vol. 19 (1757), p. 632.  
 
5 S. F. Halilİnalcık and D. Quataert, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 423-424. 
 
6 K. Çelebi, Fezleke–i Tevarih, Vol. 2 (Istanbul: Ceride-i Hevadis Matbaası, 1870), p. 352, line 15. 
 
7 Alberto P Guglielmotti, Storia della marina pontificia (Roma: Tipografia Vaticano, 1856), p. 11.  
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infantry and 450 cavalry, of which only about 5,347 were fit for battle.8 The Venetians 
realised their chief strategy must be to strike at sea. 
An intensification of the siege of Candia in 1666 prompted the despatch of a 
European alliance relief force.9 Far from being a nation-state force composed of regular 
army personnel, many of those involved were volunteers engaged in a business venture 
as military entrepreneurs.10 Their efforts did not pay off. The German contingent under 
the Prince of Waldeck met with frustration and the French force, commanded by the 
Duc de Beaufort, failed to make any headway against the Ottoman besiegers.11 The 
French managed to fire off more than 3,000 cannon balls at the besieging Turks, but 
these were gathered up by the enemy and fired back at them, via three guns which were 
cast on the spot for this purpose.12 The leaders of each force were killed in the fray. The 
failure of this final effort prompted the Venetian commander, Morosini, to surrender on 
27 September 1669. The victory had cost the Ottomans an estimated 200,000 soldiers; 
the European alliance force lost almost 30,000.13 The subsequent peace negotiations in 
1670 saw Venice lose control of almost all of Crete, much of Dalmatia and of the 
Aegean islands. This had obvious negative implications for the ongoing effectiveness 
of the Knights of St John to prosecute their perpetual struggle on sea against Islam.  
 
THE ORDER OF ST JOHN 
 
The Knights of St John maintained a presence throughout the period of the ‘long’ 
siege. At the start, the Thirty Years’ War was still raging in Europe, leaving Papal forces 
and the Order to form the backbone of local resistance against the Ottomans in the 
Eastern Mediterranean.14 The Order maintained more than sixty knights in Candia as a 
 
8 1651 general muster, cited in R. C. Anderson, Naval Wars in the Levant (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1952), p. 150. 
 
9 G. Hanlon, The Twilight of a Military Tradition: Italian Aristocrats and European Conflicts, 1560-
1800 (London: Taylor and Francis, 2008), pp. 152-164. 
 
10 F. Redlich, The German Military Enterpriser and his Workforce, Vol. 2 (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1965), 
pp. 5-17, 49, 93-96. 
 
11 M. Pollock (trans.), J. F. M. Arouet de Voltaire, The Age of Louis XIV (London: J. M. Dent, 1961 
[1751]), p. 89; Père Anselme, Histoire Genealogique et Chronologique de la Maison Royale de France, 
Vol. 1, 3rd edition (Paris: Compagnie des Libraires, 1726), pp. 196–198. 
 
12 M. Rashid, Tarih–i Rasid (Istanbul: Ibrahim Muteferrika, 1740), fol. 52v, quoted in Murphy, Ottoman 
Warfare, 1500–1700, p. 242. 
 
13  Jan Morris, The Venetian Empire: A Sea Voyage (London: Faber & Faber, 1980), p. 89; P. A. Prince, 
Parallel History: Being an Outline of the History and Biography of the World, Contemporaneously 
Arranged, Vol. 2 (London: Whittaker and Co., 1843), p. 229; C. Cook and P. Broadhead (eds), The 
Routledge Companion to Early Modern Europe, 1453–1763 (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 116.  
 
14 L. Pezzolo, ‘Aspetti della struttura militare veneziana in Levante fra cinque e scicento’, in Redolfi (ed) 
Venezia e la difensa del Levante, p. 88; Hanlon, The Twilight Of A Military Tradition, p. 152. 
28 GLOZIER 
 
reliable battalion in addition to knights on the water engaged in patrolling the Aegean.15 
The Order’s fleet of eight galleys was active, having abandoned sailing ships 
completely after 1645 due to the availability of Venetian ports for its oared galleys.16 
However, the Order’s relations with Venice were at times tense: for example, at the 
high-point of the siege, in August 1668, a dispute over naval precedence prompted a 
Venetian ship to fail to salute with a canon salvo the flagship of the Grand Master. This 
caused scandal and offence to the knightly captain, Clemente Accarigi, and led to the 
hasty departure of the Order’s forces from the waters surrounding Chania. The 
disagreement was not fatal to the siege and the overall commander, Vincenzo 
Rospigliosi (nephew of Pope Clement IX and commander of the papal galleys), was 
soon writing to the Grand Master in praise of Accarigi.17 
The story of one young knight exemplifies the generally pugnacious attitude adopted 
by the Order during the siege of Candia. Fra’ Agostino Grimaldi, a scion of the ruling 
house of Monaco, was one of seventy knights commanding 400 soldiers led by Fra’ 
Antonio Correa Montenegro. When he wrote a letter to his mother on 23 August 1660, 
he signed it: ‘Your most obedient son on the way to become eternity’.18 During an 
assault on the small fortress of Santa Veneranda, shortly after his twenty-first birthday, 
Grimaldi – fighting ‘like a lion’ (according to his companions) – was hit by a Turkish 
musket ball which entered over one hip and went out through the other. The Turk who 
shot him was quickly killed by Grimaldi’s companions, and his head lopped off and 
taken as a gory trophy to the generalissimo of the Christian armada. His brother knights 
buried his corpse in the church run by the friars of St Augustine, in the fortress of 
Suda.19 
In the final great push of 1668, the knights fought valiantly (as, indeed, they 
continued to do; for example, at the Conquest of Belgrade in 1689 as part of the 
Dalmatian campaign begun by the Turks as a diversion during the Candia siege).20 To 
emphasize the length of the siege, no less than five Grand Masters of the Order of St 
John served in that position during the course of the siege of Candia. Though small 
 
15 C. Viscount Terlinden, Le Pape Clément IX et la guerre de Candie (1667-1669) d’après les archives 
secrètes du Saint-Siège (Louvain: Typ. C. Peeters, 1904), p. 118.  
 
16 E. Buttigieg and S. Phillips, Islands and Military Orders, c.1291-c.1798 (London: Ashgate Publishing, 
2013), p. 81; Sire, The Knights of Malta, p. 88. 
 
17 K. M. Setton, Venice, Austria, and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century (Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1991), pp. 204-205. 
 
18 D. Gennaro, ‘La tela del cavaliere Agostino Grimaldi ritorna a nuova vita’, Attualità - Il Centro Studi 
La Contea lo ha donato all’amministrazione nel corso di una cerimonia a palazzo Grimaldi, Modica, 3 
July (2011). At: http://www.corrierediragusa.it/articoli/attualit%C3%A0/modica/14062-la-tela-del-
cavaliere-agostino-grimaldi-ritorna-a-nuova-vita.html. Accessed 25 July 2017. 
 
19 G. Bonello, ‘Fra Agostino Grimaldi: The aftermath of the hero’s death’, 13 December (2015). At: 
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20151213/life-features/Fra-Agostino-Grimaldi-The-
aftermath-of-the-hero-s-death.595594. Accessed 25 July 2017. 
 
20 F. Sassi, ‘La campagna di Dalmazia durante la Guerra di Candia’, Archivia Veneto (1937), p. 229. 
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numerically, the efforts of the stout battalion of the Order that existed and fought on 
Crete throughout the long siege was precious in the memory of the Knights of St John 
and their Grand Masters. The Order even went so far as to honour non-members of the 
Order who assisted its efforts on Crete, including in 1650 the French paladin, Louis, 
duc d’Arpajon. He was granted the rare honour of a hereditary Cross of Devotion of the 
Order in recognition of his efforts in the defence of Candia.21 The Order and its Grand 
Masters understood very well the intimate connection between the fate of Candia and 
the future of their island stronghold of Malta. When the siege ended in defeat in 1669, 
Grand Master Nicolas Cotoner realised Malta had become the front line against the 
Ottomans. He promptly set about enclosing the Three Cities on the south side of the 
Grand Harbour in a ring of walls still called the ‘Cotonera Lines’.22 
 
A CRUSADE? 
 
But was Candia a crusade? Voltaire described the conflict in terms of a battle between 
rival faiths:  
 
Times were greatly changed. Formerly, when Christendom was in a 
barbarous state, a pope, or even a monk, could send forth millions of 
Christians to make war upon the Mahometans in their own empire … 
and now that the island of Candia, deemed the bulwark of 
Christendom, was overrun by sixty thousand Turks, the Christian 
kings looked on with indifference while it was lost. A few galleys sent 
by the Maltese and the pope were the only reinforcements this republic 
received to defend itself against the whole Ottoman Empire. The 
senate of Venice, with all its prudence, was unable with such weak aid 
to withstand the grand vizier, Kiuperli.23  
 
It is interesting that the most recent work of scholarship on the siege of Candia also 
refers to the concept of crusade.24 The French historian, Géraud Poumarède, similarly 
highlights the ongoing antipathy created between Christian and Muslim by the activities 
 
21 R. Béteille, Louis, duc d’Arpajon, seigneur de Sévérac et grand du royaume (1590-1679): Actes de la 
journée d'étude organisée à Lapanouse de Sévérac, le 28 octobre 2006 par la Société des lettres, sciences 
et arts de l'Aveyron, en collaboration avec la Communauté de communes du canton de Sévérac et l’Office 
de tourisme du canton de Sévérac-le-Château (Aveyron: Société des lettres, sciences et arts de 
l’Aveyron, 2007). 
 
22 D. Calabi, ‘Il regno di Candia e le “fatiche” del governo civile: le “cento città”, le popolazioni, 
lefabbriche pubbliche’, in Redolfi, (ed.) Venezia e la difesa del Levante, pp. 97–106; Sire, The Knights 
of Malta, p. 80. 
 
23 The Works of Voltaire, Vol. 12 (1751), trans. W. F. Fleming (New York: E. R. Dumont, 1901), p. 139. 
24 Ozkan. Bardakçi and F. Pugnière, La Derniere Croisade Les Francais et la guerre de Candie, 1669 
(Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2008). 
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in the Mediterranean of the knights of the Order of St John.25 A variety of European 
nations supported the struggle on Crete, but this did not translate to them sending 
sufficient men to fight there. For example, in England in 1653 the Protectorate 
government of Oliver Cromwell expressed sympathy for Crete. However, sensitivities 
regarding English trade and international relations led to a very cautious attitude 
towards assistance. Cromwell refused to be drawn into the conflict, resulting in 
comparisons being made between his regime and the Ottoman Turks in contemporary 
anti-Protectorate literature: in 1656, besieged Royalists in Dunkirk were equated to 
Christians on Crete.26 In his defence, Cromwell sent a fleet under Admiral Stokes to 
strike at Tripolitanian corsair activity threatening English merchant shipping.27 In very 
broad terms, this action could be said to have assisted Venetian concerns in the 
Mediterranean. 
Regardless of deep-seated confessional conflict in Europe, moral support remained 
high for the majority-Catholic alliance forces ranged against the Ottomans. For 
example, an account of the siege was written by Roger Palmer, Earl of Castlemaine, a 
Roman Catholic English nobleman who served in the Venetian fleet. He was charged 
by Charles II with writing about the prolonged Ottoman-Venetian war and his narrative 
of this ‘Christian war’ was eagerly translated into German in the final year of the 
conflict.28 Poumarède highlights lingering uncertainty among scholars about the 
motivation that lay behind participation in the siege of Candia.29  Religious faith 
appears to have motivated the commander of the French volunteer relief force, François 
de Vendôme, Duc de Beaufort, a cadet of the French royal family. In March 1665, his 
small fleet defeated an Algerian force near the Goletta, Tunisia. In 1669, he led the 
French troops sent by Louis XIV to relieve the alliance forces defending Candia against 
the Ottoman Turks. Beaufort was killed leading the newly arrived vanguard against the 
Ottoman besiegers, dying in a night sortie, on 25 June 1669. His body was brought back 
to France for a state funeral.30 
By contrast, the fighting career of Josias II, Count of Waldeck, the younger son of a 
German princely dynasty, suggests that military professionalism inspired his 
participation. He was a veteran of the army of Frederick William, Elector of 
Brandenburg, and had served in a Swedish army against the Ottomans in central 
 
25 Géraud Poumarède, Pour en finir avec la Croisade: Mythes et réalités de la lutte contre les Turcs au 
XVIe et VIIe siècles, Coll. Quadrige (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2009), pp. 431-527. 
 
26 M. Birchwood, Staging Islam in England: Drama and Culture, 1640-1685 (Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 
2007), pp. 42-43, 109. 
 
27 T. Venning, Cromwellian Foreign Policy (London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 236-237. 
 
28 Roger, Earl of Castlemaine, Das von den Türcken auffs äusserst bedrangte, Aber: Durch die 
Christliche Waffen der heroischen Republic Venedig auffs tapfferst beschützte Candia (Frankfurt: Serlin, 
1669). 
 
29 Poumarède, Pour en finir avec la Croisade, pp. 529-617. 
 
30 Setton, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the Seventeenth Century, p. 190.  
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Europe. Following this, he took service with a cadet of the royal House of Hanover – 
George William, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg – who appointed him major-general 
and, in late autumn 1668, sent him with the Hanoverian army of 3,300 men as part of 
the alliance relief of the siege at Candia. He was injured by shrapnel on 6 July 1669 and 
subsequently died of his injuries. Among the force sent to Candia from Hanover were 
a number of exiled French Protestant Huguenots, who had found a new home in 
Hanoverian territory. The wife of George William, Duke of Brunswick-Lüneburg, was 
herself a Huguenot which caused a flood of French exiles to seek refuge in the Duke’s 
domain. One of them was Alexandre Desmier, Seigneur d’Antigny-Olbreuse, the eldest 
brother of Eléanor, Duchess of Brunswick-Lüneburg.31 There were also Scottish 
military professionals, including Sir Andrew Melville.32 
 
THE DOUGLAS REGIMENT 
 
A Scottish regiment in French service played an unexpected role in the story of the 
siege of Candia. The story of this regiment reveals much about French attitudes to the 
conflict (and to military operations generally in the era). The régiment de Douglas – 
later The Royal Scots, Scotland’s premier infantry regiment – was the family regiment 
of the Scottish Douglas dynasty. It had existed in France since 1633.33 Lord George 
Douglas took command of the unit in 1656 as his inheritance from the Douglas estates; 
in other words, the unit was a money-making venture equivalent in value to land.34 
Douglas recruited thousands of Scottish soldiers for the family regiment in France.35 
He is an interesting character: loyal to Charles II as King of Scots, but tied to Louis 
XIV as an employer; a proud Scot, but profoundly Francophile, having been ‘brought 
up to favour the French from his youth’ (as a boy he had been a page to Louis XIV). 
He was also a devout Roman Catholic.36   
Douglas was eight years old when Charles I was executed and so had never known 
(to date) a ruling British sovereign. His only example of a successful, reigning monarch 
 
31 A. Flick, ‘“The Court at Celle … is completely French”: Huguenot Soldiers in the Duchy of 
Brunswick-Lüneburg’, in M. Glozier and D. Onnekink (eds), War, Religion and Service: Huguenot 
Soldiering, 1685-1713 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), p. 210. 
 
32 Jacques Desbordes, Memoires de monsieur Le Chevalier de Melvill (Amsterdam: Jacques Desbordes 
a la Bourse, 1705), pp. 272-275. 
 
33 D. Masson (ed.), Register of the Privy Council of Scotland, Vol. 2, No. 6 (hereafter RPCS), pp. 28, 45, 
65, 140–141; W. Forbes–Leith, The Scots men–at–arms and lifeguards in France, Vol. 2 (Edinburgh: 
William Paterson, 1882), p. 213. 
 
34 For example, State Papers Venetian (hereafter SPV), Vol. 26, pp. 39, 229, 290. 
 
 35 SPV, Vol. 26, p. 231.  
36 W. E. Knowles Middleton (ed.), Lorenzo Magalotti at the Court of Charles II (Waterloo, Ont: Wilfrid 
Laurier University Press, 1980), pp. 91, 109. 
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was Louis XIV, who had provided him with employment, honour and a courtly position 
since his childhood. Douglas was, therefore, presented with the problem of maintaining 
the integrity of his obligations to Charles II, while supporting the not-always 
complementary policies of King Louis XIV of France. The Candia episode of 1669 
highlights the vexed position of expatriate soldiers like Douglas. In 1669 – right at the 
end of the long story of Candia’s siege – Douglas, like so many of his countrymen, all 
too easily became a pawn in a political game between two masters.37 
Some background helps: England went to war with the Dutch in 1665, and that 
conflict – the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1665–7) –tested the loyalty of British soldiers 
serving in foreign armies. Charles II was obliged to declare war on France due to that 
country’s formal alliance with the Dutch. This resulted in the formal cessation of many 
of the networks which supported Scottish military service in France, and was a major 
rupture in the traditional ‘auld alliance’ between France and Scotland.38 Douglas was 
obliged to choose between the service of Charles II and that of France, creating a serious 
and embarrassing conflict of interests on Douglas’s part. Charles II ordered Douglas 
and his regiment to quit French service. Douglas tendered his resignation to Louis 
XIV.39  
Peace in 1667 allowed Douglas’s regiment to return to French service.40 However, 
Louis harboured a grudge against Charles II and in retribution he broadcast his intention 
to place Douglas’s regiment in the vanguard of the French relief force he had been 
pressured into sending to Crete. The reason for choosing Douglas’s regiment for this 
mission was never clearly articulated.41 However, the choice of the Douglas regiment 
lies in Louis’s distrust of Charles’s motives stemming from the secret negotiations that 
resulted in the 1670 Treaty of Dover. It was clear to Louis XIV that the British king 
was cynically desiring an increase in his French pension, making promises he never 
intended to honour.42 The threatened sacrifice of Douglas’s regiment was designed to 
teach Charles II a lesson about avarice.43 This explains Douglas’s extreme indignation 
 
37 Hales to Arlington, Paris, 6 March/26 February 1666: National Archives (Kew), State Papers (hereafter 
NA SP) 78/122, fol. 96. 
 
38 For the background of which see E. A. Bonner, ‘Scotland’s auld alliance with France, 1295–1560’ 
History: The Journal of the Historical Association, Vol. 84, No. 273 (1999), pp. 5-30. 
 
39 For example, SPV, Vol. 26, pp. 39, 229, 290. 
 
40 RPCS, Vol. 2, p. 336. 
 
41 Douglas to Lauderdale, Paris, 13 February 1669: MSS. of Alfred Morrison, Esq., in Royal Commission 
on Historical Manuscripts, Report and Appendix, Second Series, Vol. 1 (London: Printed for private 
circulation, 1883), p. 47b. 
 
42 Matthew Glozier, Scottish Soldiers in France in the Reign of the Sun King: Nursery for Men of Honour 
(Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 120-126. 
 
43 R. Lee, ‘Government and politics, 1661-1681’, PhD thesis (University of Glasgow, 1995), p. 119.  
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at the unexpected news that he and his men were to lead the attack against the Turks at 
Candia.44 Douglas knew this was a suicide mission, against which he was highly 
motivated to preserve his regiment.  
When Charles learned of the proposal concerning the Douglas regiment, he was 
outraged that his diplomatic and mercantile connections with the Ottoman Porte were 
to be compromised by his own subjects’ forced involvement in an attack on the 
Ottomans on Crete. As soon as Douglas informed him of the plan, Charles made ‘a 
decision … to stop the dispatch of this body of troops at all costs, as, if they entered 
Candia, it was feared that they might be recognised by the Turks’.45 The danger posed 
to English trade was explicitly stated as the reason why Douglas should not fight in 
Crete.46 At least one historian, Paul Sonnino, supports contemporary suggestions that 
Douglas’s regiment was specifically chosen to participate in the attack on Candia, in 
order to strike at Charles II’s interests, as Louis XIV had been piqued and frustrated by 
the British king on a number of issues.47 Douglas’s predicament stood unresolved until 
March 1669, when the Earl of St Albans reported to Lord Arlington that the Scottish 
colonel ‘has made such a kind of diligence that he has inspired others … to keep pace 
with him’.48 In the end, Douglas was justified in placing his trust in his king’s 
attachment to trade with the Ottomans.49  
The Venetians at the French court suspected all along that Louis XIV intended to 
use the siege to advantage his own trade with the Ottoman Porte to the detriment of 
England’s, by conveying Douglas’s regiment to Candia.50 Ironically, some former 
officers of Douglas’s regiment were part of the volunteer relief force which fought at 
 
 
44 P. Sonnino, ‘The Origins of Louis IV’s Wars’, in J. Black (ed.), The Origins of war in Early Modern 
Europe (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1987), pp. 119–122.  
 
45 Colbert de Croissy to Louis XIV, 28 February 1669: Archives des Affaires Étrangers, Quay d’Orsay, 
Paris (hereafter AAECP) Angleterre 94, fol. 97–8; AAECP Angleterre 93, fol. 273; Piero Mocenigo to 
the Doge and Senate of Venice, 1 March 1669: SPV, Vol. 26, p. 23.  
 
46 Marc Antonio Giustinian to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 19 March 1669: SPV, 26, p. 29; Maria 
Fusaro, ‘Cooperating mercantile networks in the early modern Mediterranean’, Economic History 
Review, Vol. 65, No. 2 (2012), p. 702; M. Fusaro, ‘Les Anglais et les Grecs. Un réseau de coopération 
commerciale en Méditerranée vénitienne’, Annales H.S.S., Vol. 58 (2003), pp. 605–625. 
 
47 BN MSS fr 6733, fols. 145–149, cited in P. Sonnino, Louis XIV and the Origins of the Dutch War 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 56. 
 
48 St. Albans to Arlington, 13 March 1669: NA SP 78/126, fol. 49. 
 
49 St. Albans to Arlington, 13 March 1669. 
 
50  Mocenigo to the Doge and Senate of Venice, 22 March 1669: SPV, 26, p. 30.   
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Candia. Hugh Mackay of Scourie, formerly a junior officer in Douglas’s regiment, 
fought as a volunteer in the Venetian relief of Candia. A committed Protestant, Mackay 
was later a prominent supporter of William of Orange in the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, but at Candia he was one of a number of men who, according to his biographer, 
‘volunteered their services on the expedition, and were accompanied by a corps of a 
hundred … officers, all eager to gain military experience’.51 For his part, Douglas came 
out of the Candia incident with the gratitude of Charles II, but in France he had to fight 
a duel. His opponent was a French princeling who was a veteran of the Candia 
campaign. The prince’s links to the French royal family suggest he acted as a proxy for 
King Louis in meting out punishment to Douglas.52 Clearly, for the French king, Candia 
provided an opportunity not for a crusade, but for political and economic advantage.  
French attitudes to the siege of Candia are also highlighted by Douglas’s link to the 
Order of St John. One of the Scottish colonel’s closest friends was Philippe de Vendôme 
(1655–1727), the Grand Prior in France of the Order of St John. Vendôme had been 
appointed Grand Prior while still a minor in 1666. In 1675, Douglas brought him over 
to England to assist with lobbying Charles II for more recruits to his regiment.53 Almost 
a decade later, Douglas served as Charles’s official representative to commiserate with 
Louis XIV on the death of his queen. Vendôme was, at that time, in England conducting 
an illicit affair with Charles’s mistress, Louise de Kérouille.54 Vendôme’s character 
reveals the true capacity of the Order’s leadership at the royal court of France in the 
closing stages of the siege of Candia. The Grand Prior’s portrait by Jacob Ferdinand 
Voet shows how lightly he appears to wear his position of leadership within the Order; 
his knightly mantle is draped loosely over one shoulder. Despite having taken vows of 
poverty, chastity and obedience, Vendôme was a headstrong cadet of the royal dynasty 
who was also a spend-thrift libertine. This goes some way towards explaining the 
Order’s ineffectiveness in inspiring action from Louis XIV against the Ottomans on 
Crete. Vendôme was not a strenuous advocate in France of the Order’s Mediterranean 
interests and displayed none of the resolve and courage of his great-uncle, the Duc de 
Beaufort, who died leading the French vanguard against the Ottomans at Candia in 
1669. 
 
 
 
 
51  Mackay, Life of Lieut. General Hugh Mackay, p. 5. 
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54 H. Fornéron, The Court of Charles II, 1649-1734: Compiled from State Papers (London, 1897), pp. 
264-269; Newsletter to Madam Katherine Radcliffe, Dilston, 28 July 1683: Admiralty Greenwich 
Hospital 2, no. 71. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The result of the Candia campaign was that the Turks gained both Crete and a valuable 
knowledge of the latest French siege techniques. They later employed these ideas to 
their advantage during their siege of Vienna, where the lessons they learned at Candia 
about the advantages of tenacious entrenching were repeated with dangerous effect. On 
the wider geo-political scene, the loss of Candia freed the forces of the Ottoman Empire 
to press the army of the Holy Roman Empire on its eastern front in Hungary. This 
represented a blow to Imperial Christian diplomatic and military initiatives as it forced 
Emperor Leopold I to engage enemies on two fronts: the French threat to imperial lands 
in the Spanish Netherlands (Flanders), and the suppression of Hungarian separatism 
aided by Ottoman incursions in Hungary. Given this scenario, it is not too difficult to 
see why Louis XIV did what he could to ensure that Candia was not successfully 
defended and would thus fall to the Turks in order to weaken the Imperial forces that 
were his enemy in Flanders. By choosing the one unit (Douglas’s) for the job which, he 
knew, had the ability to disrupt and delay the French relief sent to Candia, Louis XIV 
ensured an inadequate and confused French response to the situation. Obviously, this 
was much to the detriment of the hard-fighting alliance forces already on Crete, whose 
back-bone was formed by the pugnacious Knights of St John. 
 
 
Figure 1: City of Candia with its fortifications (1651) published in Marco Boschini, Il regno tutto di 
Candia. Delineato a parte et intagliato (Venezia: con Privileggio nelli Stati della Chiesa, e della 
Republica Venezia, 1651). 
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Figure 2: The Venetian Protectorate of Candia (1651) published in Marco Boschini, Il regno tutto di 
Candia. Delineato a parte et intagliato (Venezia: con Privileggio nelli Stati della Chiesa, e della 
Republica Venezia, 1651). 
 
 
Figure 3: The Siege of Candia with details of a naval battle between the fleet of the Order of St John 
and Ottoman ships (1668) published by Nicolaes Visscher (1618-1679) in the Atlas Van der 
Hagen held in the catalogue of the Koninklijke 
Bibliotheek: http://opc4.kb.nl/DB=1/TTL=1/LNG=EN/PPN?PPN=353012750. 
